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ABSTRACT 
This article examines three aspects of tax administration that are widely thought to play a 
particularly critical role in tax enforcement: the examination (or audit) function, information 
reporting and the criminal enforcement process. A careful look at the IRS budget devoted to the 
first two of these demonstrates that a major shift in tax enforcement policy has occurred during 
the last decade---fewer people have been audited, but those who have been were punished more 
severely. This shift in enforcement policy raises important questions both of the efficacy and 
fairness of the tax administrative process. Although not apparent through budget allocations, a 
similar pattern has occurred with respect to criminal enforcement. In addition, the shift of IRS 
resources toward enforcement of nontax crimes and the increased use of grand juries also raises 
important questions about these IRS criminal enforcement process. 
THE CHANGING FACE OF TAX ENFORCEMENT, 1978-1988 
Jeffrey A. Dubin, Michael A. Graetz, and Louis L. Wilde* 
I INTRODUCTION 
Published reports of the so-called "tax-gap," the amount of underreported federal income 
taxes, now estimated to have been $83-$94 billion in 1987, and of taxes due but uncollected, now 
estimated to have been $61-$72 billion in 1987, have raised questions about administration of the 
federal tax system.1 In some quarters, these reports have simply led to calls for more funding for
the Service. We, however, regard the current public focus on the Service as creating an 
opportunity for serious discussion of tax administration, a subject long ignored in both scholarly 
and professional literature. 
We propose here to examine three aspects of tax administration that are widely thought to 
play a particularly critical role in tax enforcement: the examination (or audit) function, 
information reporting, and the criminal enforcement process. A major shift in tax enforcement 
policy has occurred during the last decade. Greate reliance has been placed on information 
reporting; on the hand, fewer people have been audited or criminally prosecuted for tax 
violations, but those who have been so treated have been punished more severely. These shifts in 
enforcement policy raise important questions of both the efficacy and the fairness of the tax 
administrative process. 
Before detailing our findings regarding these aspects of enforcement policy, however, we 
shall provide a brief overview of the Service's budgets during the past decade. We shall then turn 
to a more detailed examination of the Service's audit and criminal investigation functions, 
including a presentation of data concerning penalties. Since we have a substantial amount of 
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Theodore Seto for helpful comments and Jerry Hauck, Seth Hendon and Michael Udell for 
research assistance. Professor Graetz is currently serving as Deputy Assistant Secretary (Tax 
Policy) of the Treasury. This article was written before Professor Graetz assumed that office and 
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1 The most recent Service estimates of the tax gap can be found in Internal Revenue Service 
Income Tax Compliance Research: Net Tax Gap and Remittance Gap Estimates (Supplement to 
Publication 7285), Publication 1415, April 1990. 
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information to present, we have accepted the old saw about saving many words through pictures, 
and generally have tried to summarize our data in graphs. Finally, we offer some conclusions and 
suggestions for further research. 
II AN OVERVIEW OF THE SERVICE'S BUDGET2
The Budget in General 
The Service is an extremely large administrative agency; as of 1988, it had a budget of 
more than $5 billion and almost 115,000 employees. Even adjusted for inflation, the operating 
costs of the Service have increased significantly during the past ten years---by about 40%. In 
contrast, costs as a percentage of revenues have remained relatively constant over a very long 
period of time, amounting in 1987 to about 55 cents per $100 of taxes net of refunds, the same as 
in 1960. In 1988, this figure increased by about 10% to 60 cents net of refunds.3 Inflation
adjusted costs per return filed present a similar pattern, while real net tax collections per capita 
increased by about 16% during the past decade. Table I summarizes the costs of administering 
the federal tax system for selected years since 1970. 
[Table 1 approximately here] 
Recent years have produced substantial growth in Service personnel. The method of 
calculating the number of employees changed between 1982 and 1983, making comparisons before 
and after that date difficult, but it is significant that the total number of personnel grew by 
nearly 32,000 empioyees between i983 and i988, from 83,605 to 114,873, amounting to an 
increase of more than 35%. On the other hand, with the exception of 1988, the costs of collecting 
$100 of taxes net of refunds was virtually flat during this period and total returns filed grew only 
from $171 million to $194 million, about 13 1/2%. Graph I depicts the number of individual 
returns filed in the years from 1978 to 1988. 
[Graph 1 approximately here] 
Budget Allocations 
During the past decade, the allocation of the Service's resources has shifted significantly. 
While "returns processing and computer services" have increased from about one-quarter to more 
than one-third of the Service's budget, almost all other activities have suffered a decline in 
budgetary share. The only other activity that has grown significantly is "appeals," up from 2.6% in 
1978 to 4.8% in 1988. "Taxpayer service" is down from 8.25% in 1978 to 6.55% in 1988 (up from 
2 Data used in this section can be found in Annual Report of the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue. 1978-88. A more extensive discussion can be found in Dubin, Graetz, and Wilde, "The 
Report of the United States to the International Fiscal Association on the Administrative and 
Compliance Costs of Taxation," in Cahiers of the International Fiscal Association, 43 Congress 
(Kluwer, The Netherlands, 1989):311-344. 
3 This increase may have been related to the costs of administering the 1986 Tax Reform Act. 
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5.7% in 1987) and "technical rulings and enforcement litigation" is down from 3.3% in 1978 to 
1.4% in 1988. Of particular importance, the share of the Service's budget devoted to 
"examinations" (audits) declined from 34.4% in 1978 to 27.8% in 1988. 
Table 2 details the allocations of the Service's budget for the years 1978 through 1988 and 
shows changes in budget categories in real dollars and as a percent of total costs during that 
period. Graph 2 depicts the budget allocation of the Service by activity as a percentage of the 
total Service budget for fiscal years 1978 through 1988. 
[Table 2 approximately here) 
[Graph 2 approximately here] 
These shifts in budget allocations are revealing even at a glance. For example, they 
foretell significant reductions in audit levels, which we detail in Section III below, and 
demonstrate increasing Service reliance on computer processing, thereby making clear the 
necessity for the Service to become and remain technologically up-to-date. Although the budget 
share devoted to appeals still accounts for a relatively small amount of the overall Service budget, 
its increase suggests a fruitful avenue for further inquiry; we shall refrain here from offering 
speculation about the causes of this change. 
This division of the Service's overall budget, however, tells only a part of the story. In 
fact, it sometimes conceals as well as reveals. The proportion of the Service's budget devoted to 
criminal investigation, for example, has altered only slightly during the past decade, but the 
criminal investigation process has changed substantiaiiy. We shali tell this part of the story in 
Section V below. 
Let us now examine the enforcement process in greater detail. We shall begin with audits. 
III THE DECLINE IN AUDITS AS AN ENFOJ'.lCEMENT WEAPON4
Individual Audit Rates 
Audits, which---withholding aside---historically have been the Service's principal tax 
enforcement weapon, have declined significantly over the past two decades. As illustrated by 
Graph 3, the total audit coverage of individuals has shown a steady decline during the past decade 
from an audit rate of about 2% in 1978 to I% in J 988. If one goes back further in time, the 
decline is even more precipitous; audit coverage exceeded 6% in 1965. 
[Graph 3 approximately here] 
When the audit coverage data is disaggregated by income bracket, an even more dramatic 
picture emerges. Direct decade-long comparisons are not possible because, beginning in 1981, the 
4 Data on audit rates, "no-change" rates, marginal yield to cost ratios, and voluntary
compliance rates can be found in Annual Report of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. 1978-
1988. Data on informaiion reports and CP2000s was obtained directly from the Service. 
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Service began classifying individuals for statistical purposes based on total positive income rather 
than taxable income. Nevertheless, a dramatic decline in coverage is undisputable. As Graph 4 
indicates, the audit rate for nonbusiness returns with gross income of $50,000 or more dropped 
from almost 8% in 1981 to 2 I /3% in 1988. The audit rate of nonbusiness returns with taxable 
income in excess of $50,000 had been more than 10% in l 978. The audit rate for business returns 
with total positive income in excess of $25,000 dropped from 4 2/3% in 1981 to about 2 1/4% in 
1988. In 1978, the audit rate for business returns with more than $25,000 of taxable income had 
been over 7%. 5 
[Graph 4 approximately here] 
Audit coverage of Subchapter S corporations and partnerships shows a similar but less 
precipitous long-term decline, as Graph 5 indicates. The graph reflects the increased audits of 
tax shelter partnerships during the late 1970s and early 1980s, but the audit rates in both 
categories converge at about I% in 1988. 
[Graph 5 approximately here] 
The Service uses a variety of mechanisms in an attempt to increase audit effectiveness. 
The most important of these is the Taxpayer Compliance Measurement Program (TCMP), which 
is a series of special audits that the Service conducts about every three years. For individuals, 
these audits cover about 50,000, i.e., randomly-selected taxpayers, and are quite comprehensive. 
The data collected from these special audits are analyzed using a statistical technique known as 
discriminant function analysis (DIF). The detaiis of the analysis are one of the best kept secrets 
in government, but the goal is to identify the characteristics of returns that are likely to yield 
additional revenue if audited. The higher the DIF score associated with a return, the more likely 
that an audit of the return will yield additional revenue above a threshold amount. The primary 
use of DIF scores is to select returns for routine audits. Routine audits are considerably less 
detailed than TCMP audits and typically focus on a fairly narrow range of return items. 
There is some evidence that these efforts have been effective. For all individuals, the "no 
change" rate in 1988 was 14%, down from an historic rate of about 25%. This seems to confirm 
the Service's claim that it has improved its ability to select those returns for audit most likely to 
result in change, although the no change rates still ranged from 10% to 22%. 
At the same time, the Service recognizes that the no-change rate is not the only relevant 
measure of audit efficiency. For example, the Service's estimate of voluntary compliance for 
5 Significantly, the number of returns in the category of nonbusiness returns with total 
positive income over $50,000 increased signifcantly during this period, from about 2.25 million 
returns in 1981 to 10 million in 1988. By comparison, the $10,000-$50,000 nonbusiness category 
increased only from 47.5 million in 1981 to 56 million returns in 1988 and the category of 
nonbusiness returns with total positive income under $ 10,000 dropped from nearly 37 million in 
1981 to less than 30 million returns in 1988. This may explain part of the dramatic fall in audit 
average of high income individuals, but it is unlikely that it explains it all. 
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noncorporate businesses is about 15% lower than that for individuals without business income. 
Even though voluntary compliance is estimated to be lower for noncorporate businesses, marginal 
yield-to-cost ratios (additional tax and penalty from examinations compared to examination costs) 
are also lower. This is in part due to relatively higher audit coverage,6 but another possible
explanation is unreported business income which is difficult to detect by audit. 
Information Reports and CP2000s 
At least for some taxpayers, the Service has compensated for the decline in audit coverage 
by matching tax return information with information from third parties (e.g. employers and 
payors of interest and dividend income). Whenever the discrepancy between the self-reported 
tax return information and the information reported by third parties is above a threshold, an 
automatic notice, the CP2000, that taxes are due is sent to taxpayers. CP2000 notices are also 
used to inform taxpayers that additional taxes are due for certain other reasons, for example, due 
to mathematical errors. The number of both information returns and CP2000s has increased 
dramatically in the past decade. As indicated in Graph 6, the total number of information reports 
per tax return filed increased from around 6 in 1978 to over 9 in 1985 (the latest year for which 
this data is available), while non-W2 forms by themselves increased from 3.5 to 6. Overall, the 
number of information reports received by the Service increased from about 600 million in 1980-
--covering 16 types of income---to about 1 billion in 1988---covering 29 types of income and 
one deduction (home mortgage interest). The pattern is less clear in the case of CP2000s, shown . 
in Graph 7, although the rate of issuance of CP2000s ultimately increased to 3.58% in 1988, a 
level that some observers regard as compensating for the declines in individual audit rates. 
Needless to say, information matching and audits are far from perfect substitutes. 
[Graphs 6 and 7 approximately here] 
Corporate Audits 
The process for auditing corporations is quite different from that for individuals. Most 
large corporations are audited regularly, and audit rates are quite high for corporations over $1 
million. The marginal yield-to-cost ratios, however, are about the same as the individuals, except 
for the largest corporations. The estimated marginal yield-to-cost ratio for the very largest 
corporations (over $100 million of assets), for example, is too high to measure meaningfully. 
The Commissioner's 1988 annual report, however, does show significant declines from the 
prior year's audit coverage of corporations with assets between $50 million and $250 million, a 
category that recently has produced about $7 of assessments at the margin for each dollar of 
6 For individual nonbusiness returns, the audit rate in 1988 varied from 0.35% for the lowest
income category Form 1040A returns to 2.32% for returns with total positive income in excess of 
$50,000. The audit rate in 1988 for noncorporate nonfarm business returns ranged from 1.45% to 
4.20% and for noncorporate farm returns from 0.78% to 2.74%. 
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examination costs. Overall, the number of corporations audited has decreased from 14 7 ,340 in 
1977 to 38,076 in 1988. 
Because there are far many small corporations than large corporations, that portion of 
Graph 8 which illustrates the audit coverage of total corporations is best regarded as depicting the 
audit rate of small corporations. Here the audit rate has declined from 8% in 1978 to 1 l /3% in 
1988. 
[Graph 8 approximately here] 
A more interesting picture emerges when corporate audit rates are disaggregated by 
corporate size, as in Graph 9. Working from the bottom of this graph to the top, we see that 
audit rates of small corporations, those with assets of $100,000 to $1 million, closely resemble the 
patterns of total corporations depicted in Graph 8. The audit rate of corporations with assets 
between $1 million and $10 million has declined from 27% to about 3%; the audit rate of 
corporations with assets of $10 million to $100 million has declined from over 40% to less than 
20%; and the coverage of corporation with more than $100 million of assets has declined from 
almost 80% to just over 50%. 
[Graph 9 approximately here] 
Yield vs. Costs 
As with individuals, therefore, a significant decline in audit coverage of corporations has 
occurred during the past decade. In both cases, it seems clear that opportunities for productive 
audits remain. In 1988, the total recommended additional tax andpenalties from examinations 
exceeded $18.5 billion for an average $13.72 yield for each dollar of examination cost. Since the 
audit process is designed to select first returns with the highest potential yield, marginal yield-to­
cost ratios are, of course, lower. These marginal yield-to-cost ratios have ranged recently from 
about $3 in the least productive individual audit categories to about $7 in the highest. Corporate 
marginal yield-to-cost ratios have been about the same as for individuals (except, as noted earlier, 
for the largest corporations). 
These yield-to-cost ratios reflect recommended additions to taxes and penalties. The 
amounts actually collected apparently are lower. These figures also include only direct Service 
costs and do not take into account the often quite substantial costs that taxpayer incur when they 
are audited. On the other hand, the marginal yield-to-cost estimates do not include the general 
deterrence effects of audits. Our own estimates suggest that these revenues may be significant, 
perhaps as high as 5 to l for the ratio of indirect to direct revenues for individual returns.7
7 These estimates are presented in Dubin, Graetz, and Wilde (1989), "The Effect of Audit
Rates on Federal Income Tax Filings and Collections, 1977-1986." 
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IV THE INCREASED ROLE OF CIVIL PENAL TIES8
While the available data is inexact and specific estimates should, therefore, be viewed 
cautiously, the pattern of increasing civil penalties during the 1980s is indisputable. New and 
larger penalties enacted during recent years have dramatically increased the gross and net amounts 
of penalties assessed for both individuals and corporations. Admittedly rough data contained in 
the Report of the Commissioner's Task Force on Penalties suggest that for individuals, the total 
net amount of penalties (assessments minus abatements) increased from less than $1 billion in 
1978 to more than $6 billion in 1988 ($10.9 billion in penalties assessed minus $4.8 billion of 
penalties abated).9 Nonfraud understatement penalties, negligence penalties and fraud penalties
for individuals increased from just over $40 million in 1978 to nearly $400 million in 1988. The 
amount of penalties assessed under section 6661 for substantial understatements of tax rose from 
$1.75 million in 1985 to $114.5 million in 1988. As an average amount of penalty per individual 
return examined, this represents an increase from about $22 to $375. 
For corporations, net penalties increased from less than $18 million to $118 million and 
the average amount of penalty per return examined increased from $120 to $3,100 during the 
same period.1° For example, in 1986, net corporate penalties totalled about $49 million ($35
million in 1987) and the average amount of penalty per return examined was about $835 ($795 in 
1987 . )  
For individuals, the proportion representing fraud penalties has decreased dramatically, as 
we wouid expect due to the enactment of many new nonfraud, nonnegligence penalties. In 1978, 
for example, fraud penalties accounted for nearly 80% of individual penalties; by 1988 this 
relationship had reversed, with fraud penalties accounting for only one-quarter of the total. The 
pattern is not so dramatic for corporations. In 1978, fraud penalties accounted for nearly 90% of 
the total; in 1988, 62.5%, and in the more typical year of 1986, just under one-half of total 
corporate penalties were due to fraud. 
The relationship of these penalties to the total of additional taxes and penalties due to 
examinations has also increased substantially. Graph 10 presents rough estimates of the pattern of 
average penalty rates assessed by examinations for individuals, during the period 1979 to 1988. It 
shows an average penalty rate of about 2% in 1979 and 14% in 1988. 
8 Data on civil penalties can be found in Annual Report of the Commissioner of Internal 
Revenue, 1978-88 and Report of the Commissioner's Task Force on Penalties. We supplemented 
this data with information obtained directly from the Service to contruct the civil penalty rates 
shown in Graph 10. 
9 Abatements in any year do not necessarily relate to assessments for that same year. 
10 In 1988, however, the corporate fraud penalty far exceeds any other year and is about four
times as great as other years. We have no explanation for this anomaly. 
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[Graph 10 approximately here] 
Similar computations for corporations suggest that penalty assessments are playing a far 
less significant role. In 1988, corporate penalties accounted for about $118 million of the total 
$11.7 billion of additional taxes and penalties assessed, or about 1% of the total. The comparable 
numbers for 1987 are $35 million in penalties compared to $10.6 billion total additional taxes and 
penalties, or 0.3%. A penalty rate computation similar to that performed above for individuals 
produces average corporate penalty rates of I% for 1988, 0.45% for 1986 and 0.3% for 1980. 
A few general observations may be useful. First, the direct revenue impact of penalties, 
particularly of the more controversial nonnegligence, nonfraud penalties is not large, although it 
is significantly larger as a proportion of additional taxes and penalties collected for individuals 
than for corporations. Direct penalty collections, of course, are not an estimate of the revenue 
effect of penalties because they ignore the effect of the penalties' existence on the amount of tax 
reported. 
Second, the number of penalties assessed and abated has grown significantly in the past 
decade, from about 17 million in 1978 to more than 30 million in 1988. Employment tax penalties 
account for a significant proportion of the increase, having risen from 7.3 million in 1978 to 12.6 
million in 1988. Failures to pay penalties have also increase substantially, from nearly 7 1/2 
million assessed in 1978 to 14 3/4 million in 1988. 
In sum, enforcement, especially for individuals, seems to now involve a combination of 
fewer audits with more frequent and significant penalties imposed on audited taxpayers. Along 
with the recent disallowance of interest deductions on tax understatements, the expected costs to 
those taxpayers who are audited have increased significantly. In addition, the increase in the 
Service's budget allocation for appeals seems to imply, at a minimum, that being audited has 
become both a more elaborate and more costly enterprise for taxpayers. Of course, to the extent 
that information matching has replaced simple aµdits, taxpayers avoid the costs of an audit. 
V THE CHANGING FACE OF CRIMINAL TAX ENFORCEMENT11
Let us begin this section of this essay with a group photograph. What do the following 
people have in common? Al Capone, former gangster; William Campbell, a United State Judge 
for forty-eight years who had previously been involved in the prosecution of Al Capone; Mickey 
Cohen, former gangster; Robert B. Anderson, former Secretary of the Treasury; Joseph D. Nunan, 
Jr., former Commissioner of Internal Revenue; Dave Beck, former President of the Teamsters 
Union; Chuck Berry, rock and roll star; Albert Nippon, fashion designer; Mario Biaggi, former 
congressman and, as of 1989, the most decorated New York City policeman; Spiro Agnew, former 
Vice-President of the United States; Dana Kirk, former basketball coach at Memphis State 
ii Data on criminal tax enforcement was obtained directly from the Service. 
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University; Robert Huttenbach, former Chancellor of the University of California, Santa Barbara; 
Victor Posner, millionaire industrialist; Harry Reems, co-star of the porn classic "Deep Throat;" 
Leona Helmsley, the "Queen" of the Helmsley Hotel chain; Moses Annenberg, founder of TV 
Guide; Pete Rose, former baseball player and manager. Such a list might go on and on; what the 
foregoing group of people have in common is a conviction for a tax crime. 
In a sense, where criminal tax enforcement is concerned, there is nothing new under the 
sun. The foregoing list deliberately spans more than five decades of criminal tax enforcement, a 
process which has long been characterized by prosecutions of highly visible individuals who have 
violated only the tax laws as well as prosecutions for tax crimes of persons engaged in nontax 
criminal activity. Indeed, violation of criminal tax statutes has long been a natural and frequently 
inevitable handmaiden of the commission of many nontax crimes. 
Recent statutory changes in federal criminal law, however, have multiplied the potential 
federal criminal violations that may now accompany what historically would have been solely 
state crimes. The most important of these are RICO (the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt 
Organizations statute), 12 the Continuing Criminal Enterprise provisions, 13 the Back Secrecy Act, 14 
the money laundering prohibitions, 15 the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act 16 and other federal drug 
offense legislation. 
The financial investigation skills of the Service's special agents can and does serve an 
important function in detecting and successfully prosecuting nontax federal financial crimes, most 
notably violations of the Bank Secrecy Act and money laundering statutes. Thus, it is no surprise 
that recent years have witnessed a significant shift of the Service's law enforcement resources in 
the direction of developing cases against narcotics dealers and other criminals. What is surprising, 
however, is that this predominantly nontax law enforcement effort may be of sufficient 
magnitude to raise questions concerning the continuing ability of the Service at current budget 
levels to use criminal enforcement adequately to fulfill its primary mission of assuring maximum 
compliance with federal tax laws. 
12 18 U.S.C. § § 1961 et seq. 
13 21 u.s.c. § 848. 
14 12 U.S.C. § § 1829b, 1951 et seq. 
15 12 u.s.c. § § 1464, 1730, 1786, 1817, 1818, 3403, 3413; 18 u.s.c. § § 981, 982, 1952, 1956, 
1957, 1961, 2516; 31 U.S.C. § § 5312, 5316 to 5318, 5321, 5322. 
16 18 U.S.C. § 1963; 19 U.S.C. § § 1589, 1600, 1602, 1605 et seq., 1644; 21 U.S.C. § § 824, 
848, 853, 854, 88 i' 970; 28 u.s.c. § 524. 
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Although the share of the Service's budget devoted to criminal enforcement has remained 
relatively constant throughout the past decade, at about 5 3/4% of the total budget, 17 the 
increasing role of the Service in enforcing nontax federal crimes, perhaps in combination with the 
declining audit rate, has changed the sources of the Service's criminal prosecutions. Far fewer 
cases now originate with examination. Use of grand juries in tax enforcement has increased 
dramatically. In addition, the criminal enforcement story shares an important feature in common 
with the civil enforcement facts we have just presented: those who are caught are likely to face 
stiffer penalties, in this case, prison sentences. 
If one begins by attempting to develop a "criminal enforcement" rate, analogous to an 
"audit rate," two very different pictures emerge. As Graph 11 shows, the past decade has 
witnessed a sharp drop, a drop of about two-thirds, in the criminal investigation rate, the number 
of criminal investigations started as a percentage of returns filed. Because of the corresponding 
drop in the audit rate during this same time period (as described in Section II, above), however, 
the number of criminal investigations as a percentage of returns examined does not reflect this 
same trend. 
[Graph 11 approximately here] 
If one regards prosecutions or convictions, however, as better measures of the 
effectiveness of the criminal enforcement effort, the pattern is much more positive. Graphs 12 
and 13 show that both the prosecution rate (the number of indictments and informations as a 
percentage of returns filed) and the conviction rate (the number of convictions as a percentage of 
returns filed) show a steady increase in recent years, and the data with regard to prosecutions and 
convictions as percentages of returns examined are also more encouraging. 
[Graphs 12 and 13 approximately here] 
The data in Graphs 12 and 13 seem to suggest that the Service has become better at 
selecting its criminal cases, an observation that is confirmed when one looks at the ratio of 
convictions to investigations started, which has risen from almost 15% in 1978 to almost 50% in 
1988.18
[Graph 14 approximately here] 
But the selection of cases for criminal investigation that more frequently lead to 
prosecution and conviction cannot be attributed solely to the Service's criminal investigation 
division. Although the entire Service's criminal enforcement program has as its goal improving 
17 Budget data can found in Annual Report of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 1970-
1988. 
18 These ratios were calculated using convictions in one year divided by investigations started
in that year. The results are only slightly different if the ratio is calculated using convictions in 
one year divided by the investigations started in the previous year (which might more closely 
approximate the true chronology of a criminal case). Graph 14 plots both ratios. 
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voluntary compliance with the tax laws, 19 many tax convictions result from the Service's
participation in law enforcement efforts directed principally at nontax criminal activity, most 
significantly involving drugs, money laundering or organized crime. The Service historically has 
classified cases as in either the General Enforcement Program ("GEP"), the category of cases in 
which violations of the criminal tax statutes are principally at issue, or the Special Enforcement 
Program ("SEP"), which includes cases in which a nontax crime is typically coupled with a tax 
crime.20 Graph 15 depicts the share of total criminal enforcement cases accounted for by the SEP
cases during the period 1979 to I 988. As that graph shows, SEP cases began by the late I 980s to 
approach accounting for one-half of the Service's criminal enforcement activity. 
[Graph 15 approximately here] 
The targets of SEP investigations typically are selected by law enforcement agencies other 
than the Service.21 As Graphs 16 and 17 demonstrate, these cases are more productive than GEP
cases, both in terms of prosecutions and convictions. In 1988, for example, the ratio of 
indictments to investigations started was 64% in the SEP program compared to less than 5 I% in 
the GEP program. The ratio of convictions to investigations started shows a similar pattern (58% 
versus 46% in 1988). 
[Graphs 16 and I 7 approximately here] 
The recent emphasis by the Service on SEP cases, perhaps in combination with the decline 
in audit rates, has resulted in a very different pattern of sources for the Service's criminal 
prosecutions than traditionally has been the case. In particular, there has been a striking decrease 
in the share of criminal tax cases developed through the examination process. As Graphs 18 and 
19 show, this is true for both the percentage of criminal investigations started through audits, 
which has declined from 30% in I 979 to less than 20% in I 988, and the corresponding percentage 
19 Internal Revenue Manual § 9150.
20 "[The Special Enforcement Program] encompasses the identification and investigation of 
that segment of the public who derive substantial income from illegal activities and violate the tax 
laws or other related statutes in contravention of the Internal Revenue laws. The very nature of 
their operations requires national coordination of enforcement efforts, close cooperation and 
liaison with Department of Justice and other Federal, State and local law enforcement agencies 
(see IRM 9400)." Internal Revenue Manual § 9152. 
"[The General Enforcement Program] encompasses all criminal enforcement activities of 
the Criminal Investigation Division except those included in the special enforcement program 
discussed in IRM 9 I 53. The identification and investigation of income tax evasion cases of 
substance with prosecution potential is a primary objective. The program also provides for 
balanced coverage as to types of violations, as well as geographic locations and economic and 
vocational status of violators as considered necessary to stimulate voluntary compliance." Internal 
Revenue Manual § 9 I 53. 
21 "Tax Administration: Investigating Illegal Income---Success Uncertain, Improvements
Needed," GAO/GGD-88-61. 
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of prosecutions, which has declined from nearly 30% to 14% during the same period. 
[Graphs 18 and 19 approximately here] 
Not only has the nature of criminal tax cases changed over the past decade, but the 
pattern of punishment for those convicted of tax crimes has also changed significantly. As in the 
case of civil penalties, persons convicted of tax crimes can expect greater punishment. The 
likelihood that a person convicted of tax crime will serve a prison sentence has increased 
significantly, as Graphs 20 and 21 show. In 1988, almost 64% of those convicted of tax crimes 
were sentenced to prison, compared to 42% in 1979 (down from 48% in 1978). 
[Graphs 20 and 21 approximately here] 
VI CONCLUSION 
Both the audit rate and the rate of criminal prosecutions of tax violators (who have not 
been engaged in nontax criminal activity) have declined substantially over the past decade. In an 
apparent effort to maintain deterrence, however, those audited or convicted of a tax crime have 
suffered increased penalties. 
These trends raise a number of important questions. Foremost is the question of the 
overall effect of these changes on tax compliance. Our own empirical work suggests that the 
decline in audit rates has been quite costly to the federal government. The increased reliance on 
third-party information reporting as an enforcement device does not affect the same categories of 
taxpayers nor does it identify the sarne types of tax understatements as do audits. 
Moreover, the policy of fewer investigations coupled with harsher penalties of those 
investigated raises issues of both horizontal and vertical equity. When widespread noncompliance 
is combatted through stiffer penalties on few offenders, issues of fundamental fairness are raised. 
The penalty reform legislation enacted in late 1989 reflects concern with the Service's increasing 
reliance on civil penalties during the 1980s. 22 
With regard to criminal tax enforcement, it is not clear to what extent the trends reported 
in Section V reflect deliberate changes in the Service's criminal enforcement policies. Moreover, 
to date, there is neither theoretical nor empirical scholarship to provide guidance about the effect 
of these changes on tax compliance. The data, however, suggest that such questions are worth 
asking. 
While the kinds of financial skills located in the Service's criminal investigation division, 
to be sure, have an important, perhaps even crucial, role to play in this nation's drug enforcement 
22 See§§ 7711-7743 of P. L. 101-239 (''The Improved Penalty Administration and
Compliance Tax Act of 1989"). See also, e.g., Testimony of Michael J. Saltzman, Charles J. 
Muller and James E. Merrett on behalf of the Penalties Task Force of the Section of Taxation of 
the American Bar Association, before the Subcommittee on Oversight, Committee of Ways and 
tvfeans, U.S. House of Representatives, juiy 28, i 988. 
12 
effort, we must be vigilant to ensure that the tax compliance function of the Service's criminal 
process is not short-changed as a result. The increased use of grand juries in the Service's 
investigations also raises significant questions. Even in the absence of a sound theoretical or 
empirical grounding, one cannot help but wonder whether even highly publicized drug 
enforcement by the Service has a tax compliance deterrent effect as powerful as that of pure 
enforcement cases. Empirical work addressed at this question is feasible and should be 
undertaken. 
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TABLE 1: IRS COLLECTIONS, COSTS, EMPLOYEES, RETURi�S FILED AND U.S. POPULATION: 
SELECTED YEARS, 1970-88 
Operating Gross Cost Per Refunds Net Cost Per Real Cost
2 
Cost Collections $100 Gross Collections $100 Net Employees 1 Per Emp 
($Billions) ($Billions) Collections ($Billions) ($Billions) Collections ($) 
1970 .886 195.722 .45 16.188 179.534 .49 68,683 30,719 
1975 1.585 293.823 .54 32.209 261.614 .61 82,339 32,455 
1980 2.281 519.375 .44 54.009 465.366 .49 87,464 30,428 
1981 2.465 606.799 .41 63.303 543.496 .45 86,156 30,442 
1982 2.626 632.341 .42 75.202 557.139 .47 82,857 31,697 
1983 2.969 627.247 .47 79.761 547.486 .54 83,605 34,173 
1984 3.279 680.475 .46 85.872 594.603 .55 87,635 34,742 
1985 3.601 742.872 .48 86.322 656.550 55 92,254 36,136 
1986 3.842 782.252 .49 94.425 687.827 .56 95,880 35,118 
1987 4.366 886.391 .49 96.969 789.422 .55 102,188 36,360 
1988 5.069 935.107 .54 94.480 840.627 .60 114,873 36,372 
Source: Annual Reports of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 1970-1988. 
Returns Real Cost 
Filed Per Return 
(Millions) Filed 
113.08 18.65 
125.12 21.35 
143.45 18.55 
166.52 15.75 
170.37 15.39 
171.17 16.69 
172.51 17.64 
178.22 18.17 
188.02 17.90 
193.16 19.23 
194.30 21.50 
Pop 
(Millions) 
204.88 
213.56 
228.23 
230.61 
232.96 
235.23 
237.45 
239.71 
242.00 
244.20 
245.81 
Re<l l'ot IReal Cost Collections Per Capita Per Capita 
I (S) (S) 
10.29 2086.40 
12.51 2065.79 
11.66 2379.25 
11.37 2507.21 
11.27 2391.56 
12.14 2240.08 
12.82 2325.09 
13.90 2469.73 
13.91 2551.62 
15.21 2746.54 
17.10 2818.61 
1. Figures after 1982 not strictly comparable with prior years due to change in method of accounting for realized positions per requirement of the Office of Personnel 
1'Ianagement. 
2. Adjusted by GNP implicit price deflater, 1982=100. 
1978 1979 1980 
(1) Executive 
Direction, 
1fanagement 
Services, 
Internal Audit 
& Security 59,891 65,961 70,156 
(2) Returns Processing 
Computer Service 507,384 535,333 574,179 
(3) Collection 258,302 208,613 297 ,947 
(4) Taxpayer 
Service 161,906 197,612 203,687 
(5) Examination 675,253 719,568 779,637 
(6) Employee Plans 
&Exempt 
Organizations 62,247 64,144 66,963 
(7) Tax Fraud 
Investigation 121,182 130,185 140,631 
(8) Appeals 50,939 50,525 59;750 
(9) Technical 
Rulings & 
Enforcement 
Litigation 65,025 72,225 77,889 
Total Cost (OOO's) 1,962,129 2,116,166 2,280,839 
TABLE 2: IRS COST BY ACTIVITY, 1978-88 
(thousands of$) 
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 
79,427 78,218 128,080 98,160 104,945 89,475 90,693 88,151 
611,308 650,255 681,802 890,343 1,048,470 1,247,482 1,421,112 1,721,665 
349,410 410,177 529,416 604,149 613,527 606,498 660,659 799,814 
218,153 206,584 232,660 148,293 169,874 208,212 249,606 329,597 
836,416 889,631 958,925 1,025,611 1,114,845 1,139,501 1,304,179 1,399,341 
65,126 71,315 80,039 90,431 94,398 99,031 104,980 120,988 
153,927 172,176 172,619 204,135 219,951 221,304 245,370 261,585 
68,935 67,991 121,332 150,391 1"67;263 162,639 189,694 241,890 
82,866 79,991 63,653 67,554 67,670 67,841 66,388 72,510 
2,465,469 2,626,338 2,968,526 3,279,067 3,600,953 3,&41,983 4,365,816 5,035,541 
Source: Annual Reports of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 1978-1988. 
1. Does not total 100% due to miscellaneous costs. 
% 1'.1978-88 Percent of 1'. Percent of l
Real Dollars Total Cost1 Total Costs 
1978 1988 1978-1988 
-.20 3.05 1.75 -1.30 
17.28 25.85 34.19 8.34 
7.TI 13.16 15.88 2.72 
1.15 8.25 6.55 -1.70 
5.27 34.41 27.78 ·6.63 
.32 3.17 2.40 ·.77 
1.15 6.18 5.19 -.99 
3.10 2.6-0 4.80 2.20 
-
.7 3.31 1.44 -1.87 
34.52 
Graph 1: Individual Returns Filed, 1978-88 
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